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The development of new technologies led to the emergence of digital market places
and auction portals targeted to consumers (such as e-Bay) or to industries and part-
suppliers (most industry-exchange portals). In the non-digital world, auction houses such
as Christie’s and Sotheby’s also serve as go-betweens. Since intermediaries make proﬁts
by charging commissions to buyers and sellers, it is important to analyze the welfare con-
sequences of an increase in their commissions. The question is important for competition
policy authorities evaluating the welfare losses resulting from an abuse of dominant po-
sition or a collusive agreement in the market for intermediation.1 The question is also
important from a policy point of view since taxation of proﬁts of intermediaries is likely
to result in higher commissions charged to participants.
Since commissions are taxes imposed on sellers and buyers, the economic problem
that results is similar to the question of tax incidence in consumer economics for which
we know the answer: Taxes make consumers and sellers worse oﬀ since the tax decreases
eﬀective demand or eﬀective supply; demand and supply elasticities aﬀect the relative
losses of buyers and sellers. There would be no need for a separate treatment of auction
markets if the eﬀects of larger commissions or taxes paralleled those in markets without
intermediation. This may explain why tax incidence in markets with intermediaries has
not received much attention in the literature.2
We argue that auction markets deserve a separate treatment, and show that an increase
in commissions makes sellers worse oﬀ, but some (or all) buyers may gain. Moreover, the
1As was the case for Christie’s and Sotheby’s from 1993 to 2000.
2In a diﬀerent model, Baye and Morgan (2001) consider the access prices charged by a monopolist
intermediary in a “standard” market with Bertrand competition. Each seller is a monopolist on his
local market but may have to compete with the other seller on the intermediary market. Since sellers
will be willing to pay positive access fees only if they expect not to face head-to-head competition with
probability one, access fees make sellers indiﬀerent between participating or not in the intermediary
market. The welfare comparisons in their model are ambiguous. This is partly due to the existence of
multiple equilibria. A key assumption in their model is the monopoly power of the sellers in their local
market: Sellers would prefer that the intermediary market not to exist. We consider instead situations
in which intermediation has value for the sellers.
2expected welfare of participants in the market may be larger after the increase. The
results are therefore strikingly diﬀerent from the standard result that all consumers lose
after a tax or a commission increase.
The diﬀerence in results from two speciﬁcities of auction markets. First, there is a
basic externality in auctions that is absent in other markets. In an auction, buyers and
sellers worry about the degree of competition; the willingness to pay of a buyer and the
willingness to sell of a seller depend on the degree of competition. Second, the “good”
that bidders want to purchase is risky since they face a lottery consisting of a probability
of getting the object and the expected price of the object conditional on winning. When
the degree of competition (that is the number of bidders) changes, this aﬀects both the
probability of winning and the expected price, often in opposite directions; this makes
welfare comparisons based on price changes only rather suspect.
To assess the welfare eﬀects on participants, it is necessary to take into account the
joint variation of both variables. This also suggests that the welfare consequence of
a change in commissions may be diﬀerent when assessed ex-ante (before the winner is
known) or ex-post (after he is known).
The model of intermediation in auctions that we use is standard. There is a large set
of potential bidders and sellers. Sellers oﬀe rt h es a m et y p eo fo b j e c ta n dh a v et h es a m e
valuation. Bidders are ex-ante symmetric but learn their valuation after having decided
to participate, which they do when their expected utility is larger than a positive cost of
participation.
There is a go-between who sets and announces commissions paid by buyers and sellers.
We show ﬁrst that the equilibrium payoﬀs depend on an “aggregate commission” that is
a non linear function of the buyer and seller commissions. An increase in commissions
refers to an increase in this aggregate.
Sellers adjust their reserve price as a function of the commission. A higher commission
leads to an increase in reserve prices and therefore to a decrease in the expected utility
of bidders. It follows that a higher commission induces a lower number of bidders par-
3ticipating in the auction, as well as the possibility of a higher price paid by the winner.
There is therefore the possibility that bidders will be worse oﬀ.
Our main results are the following.
• From an ex-ante perspective, as long as the cost of participation is the same for
all agents, the ex-ante average welfare of bidders is the same in the high- and the
low-commission auctions.
• Participants who are likely to win (eﬀective bidders) must have a valuation larger
than the reserve price of the seller. The average welfare of these eﬀective bidders
in the high-commission auction is strictly larger than the average welfare that they
would have had in the low-commission auction.
• Among the winners of the high-commission auction, those paying a price strictly
larger than the reserve price are strictly better oﬀ than if they had been winners in
the low-commission auction. Winners paying the reserve price are weakly worse oﬀ.
• In the ex-post stage, the question of compensating winners in the high-commission
auction is complicated by the fact that while we observe the price they pay, we do
not observe the probability they had of winning the object. Following established
practice in consumer economics for compensating consumers for price variations,
we make the thought experiment of ﬁnding the monetary transfer that would make
the winner indiﬀerent between paying the current price or facing more competition
but a lower commission (compensating variation). More competition would imply
that he wins the object less often, but potentially at a lower price. For valuations
that are uniformly distributed, we show that the winner would, on average, not be
willing to pay to face more competition and a low commission, that is to be faced
with a situation similar to the low-commission auction. Compensating winners in a
high-commission auction would therefore make them win twice.
These results suggest that in auction markets, sellers are the main losers and that
there can be reasons not to compensate buyers. While there may be a welfare loss, it
4may essentially be due to bidders who are excluded, either at the ex-ante stage or at
the interim stage, because their valuation was lower than the reserve price of the seller
in the high-commission auction. These phantom participants may deserve compensation
but they are obviously impossible to identify.
In the next section, we show that in an auction, potential buyers take into account
an increase in their commission rate by shading their bid and are therefore not directly
aﬀected. This shading decreases the price, thus aﬀecting the seller who can react by
strategically increasing his reserve price. To the extent that the reserve price aﬀects the
outcome of the auction (by increasing the price or by a failure to sell), buyers can be
indirectly hurt. Section 3 introduces a model of an auction house as an intermediary who
charges commissions on both sellers and buyers. It takes into account all the decisions
on buyers and sellers (participation decision, setting of the reserve price, bidding) as a
function of the commissions rates. In Sections 4 and 5, we show that while the ex ante
total welfare decreases that eﬀective bidders and buyers may be better oﬀ with higher
commissions.
2A ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ei m p a c to fc o m m i s s i o n si na u c -
tions
As noted by Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003), the theory of private value auctions implies
that buyers are indiﬀerent to the level of the commission. Since ascending price auctions
often used by salesrooms are strategically equivalent to second-price auctions, a bidder
has a dominant strategy to bid his valuation. The price paid by the winner corresponds
thus to the valuation of the second highest bidder. When the buyer’s commission is
raised, buyers reduce their bids by the same amount, and this results in a reduction of
the hammer price. For concreteness, suppose that the buyer’s commission cB is raised
from 0 to 20%. A buyer with a valuation of v would bid up to v in the ﬁrst case and up
to (1 − cB)v in the second one. Thus, the entire burden of the commission ends up being
borne by the seller since buyers fully endogenize the commission in their bidding.
5However, the seller is not totally passive. Economic theory has investigated how a seller
can increase his expected revenue by setting strategically a reserve price under which he
refuses to sell the object. Let us analyze how this changes our previous conclusion.
Suppose there is one seller with valuation vs and n buyers with valuations vi distributed
on [0,1] according to a cumulative density function F (·). The commission rates are cS
and cB for sellers and buyers, respectively. Hence if p is the hammer price, the buyer pays
p(1 + cB), the seller receives p(1 − cS), and the intermediary (the auction house) collects





Note that α is increasing in cS and cB. It takes its smallest value when cS = cB =0 .
In the appendix 7.1, we show that the optimal reserve price for the seller is
r −
















The optimal reserve price of the seller increases with the commission rates (see (1)), while
the surplus of the buyers decreases with r (see (2)). If, after the increase in commissions,
the winning bidder pays the reserve price, he may lose. However, if he pays more than
the reserve price, he does not lose. It is therefore easy to tell whether buyers should or
should not be compensated, but it is clear that not all of them should be.
So far we have only analyzed how commissions inﬂuence the bidding decision of buyers
and sellers (a reserve price can be interpreted as a bid). But since the welfare of buyers
and sellers may decrease with an increase in commissions, their decisions to participate in
the auction market may also change, and this will change the simple welfare considerations
made above. This is analyzed in the following three sections.
63 The auction house as an intermediary
3.1 The model
Consider the following two-sided market. On one side, there is a mass N of potential
buyers, each with a participation cost t, with distribution G(·). Assume that each buyer
wants to purchase one unit of the good, and can participate in one auction only. Par-
ticipating buyers have valuations v, that are identically and independently distributed
according to F(·). On the other side of the market, there is a mass M of potential sellers
with valuation vs and an ex-ante participation cost t, with distribution H(·).
There is a unique auction house which acts as an intermediary between buyers and sell-
ers. It organizes auctions for the objects that sellers are willing to sell and sets commission
rates (cS,c B), each a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no ft h eh a m m e rp r i c e .
Buyers are distributed uniformly among auctions. Let n denote the ratio of partici-
pating buyers over participating sellers. This ratio represents the degree of competition
among buyers in the market. If every buyer and seller participates in an auction, then
n = N/M.
The auction format used is the second price (Vickrey) auction that is strategically
equivalent to the English auction used by most salesrooms.3 Sellers decide on a reserve
price r,4 and buyers make their bids.
3.2 Participation decisions
Since commissions decrease the revenue of sellers, these are likely to change their behavior
and may decide not to participate or to participate but modify their optimal reserve price.
This has a feed-back eﬀect on the surplus of buyers and hence on their own participation.
Therefore, a change in commissions modiﬁes the number of participants and therefore the
ratio of buyers over sellers.
3We focus on second price auctions. Our results would not change if we used any other usual auction
format, since the revenue equivalence principle can be applied in our framework.
4The fact that the reserve price is often secret, coincides with reality, but does not matter here.
7Sellers’ participation
A potential seller takes c =( cS,c B) as given, anticipates n and sets his reserve price r
(which, given (1) depends only on c) to maximize Π(c,r,n)=( 1−cs)p(c,r,n)+Fn(r)vs,
where p(c,r,n) is the expected hammer price in the auction, F n(r) represents the prob-
ability that the object goes unsold and, is kept by the seller who values it at vs.H e
participates if Π(c,r,n)−t ≥ vs. The mass of participating sellers is H(Π(c,r,n)−vs)·M.
Buyers’ participation
A potential buyer takes c =( cS,c B) as given, anticipates n and r. He participates if
his cost of participating, t is smaller than his expected surplus B(c,r,n).T h e m a s s o f
participating buyers is G(B(c,r,n)) · N.
Equilibrium
Rational expectations require that n, the ratio of active buyers on active sellers solves:
n =
G(B(c,r,n) · N
H(Π(c,r,n) − vs) · M
.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Solving the model
To solve for equilibrium, we need the expressions of the optimal reserve price r,t h e
hammer price p, the surplus of sellers, Π(.) a n do fb u y e r s ,B(.).
Let b(1) and b(2) be the highest and second highest bids among the n bidders. With a





.L e tF(1,n) be the distribution of the ﬁrst order statistic when there
are n bidders and let F(2,n) (x|y) be the distribution of the second order statistic when the
ﬁrst order statistic is equal to y.
8In this case, it is immediate to see that the dominant strategy of a bidder with valuation
v is to bid b = v/(1 + cB). Hence, if there are n bidders, the i-th order bid is b(i) =
v(i)/(1 + cB), where v(i) is the i-th order valuation among the n bidders.























Making the change of variable,
ρ ≡ r(1 + cB),
























=( 1 − α)I (ρ,n)+F
n (ρ)vs (3)
and a strategic seller chooses ρ to maximize Π.5
5We assume that the seller chooses an optimal reserve price, but our qualitative results would still
obtain if we simply assumed that ρ is increasing in α. T h a tw o u l db es oi ft h es e l l e rs e t sρ = vS/(1 − cS)
in order to guarantee a price net of commission larger than his valuation vS.
9The buyer’s surplus
Standard arguments imply that the marginal surplus of a buyer is the expected proba-
bility of winning. If the reserve price is r (a function of α), all buyers with valuation
v<ρ = r(1 + cB) have a zero probability of winning. Hence, the expected surplus of a


















Bv(v,c,ρ/(1 + cB),n)f(v)dv. (4)
This surplus is clearly decreasing in n (for ﬁxed ρ) and decreasing in ρ (for ﬁxed n).
The auctioneer’s proﬁt
The auction house sets the commission rates in order to maximize its proﬁts. Its revenue
in each auction is (cS+cB)p(c,r,n)=( cS+cB)I(ρ,n)/(1+cB)=αI (ρ,n). Thus, its total
proﬁte q u a l sR = αI (ρ,n)H(Π(c,r,n)−vs)·M.T h et r a d e - o ﬀ is between the number of
transactions and the revenue that commissions generate on each transaction.
4.2 A neutrality result
We now show that the outcome of the auction depends on the commissions only to the
extent that these modify α =( cB +cS)/(1+cB). Any change in the commission structure
that leaves α unchanged, leaves unaﬀected the payoﬀs of sellers, buyers and salesroom.
Indeed, by inspection of (3), we see that the seller’s proﬁt and thus his choice of ρ depends
only on α. His optimal reserve price is equal to r = ρ/(1 + cB). The reserve price thus
depends on the commission structure, but since buyers shade their bids by the same
factor (b = v/(1+cB)), the marginal type of buyer who is excluded from the auction has
a valuation v = ρ, which depends on α only.







and depends on ρ, and thus on α only. Since participation decisions depend directly on
the surplus, the equilibrium ratio of buyers to sellers n also depends only on α.
It is then clear that the auctioneer’s proﬁt depends on α only, and that he faces a one
variable optimization problem which we can write with some abuse of notation:6
max
α∈[0,1]
R(α)=αp(n(α))H (αp(n(α))) · M.
Proposition 1 ( N e u t r a l i t yo ft h es t r u c t u r eo fc o m m i s s i o nr a t e s ) .
All commission rates (cS,c B) keeping α =( cS + cB)/(1 + cB) constant generate identical
surpluses and proﬁts for all agents in the model (buyers, sellers and auction house).
5W e l f a r e
The result of Proposition 1 allows us to restrict attention to an increase in the commissions
from α to ˆ α. In traditional markets, the increase of a tax shifts the supply and demand
curves, which results in a higher net price for buyers and a lower net price for sellers. The
welfare consequences are simple: All buyers and sellers are worse oﬀ.
In our model, the welfare consequences are more diﬃcult to evaluate. The increase in
commission leads to higher reserve prices and a lower participation of buyers. The original
auction market is characterized by a low commission α, low reserve prices ρ and a ratio
of buyers to sellers equal to n. In the new market, the commission to ˆ α > α,l e a d st o
higher reserve prices ˆ ρ and to a new ratio ˆ n. The welfare considerations depend mainly on
the ratio of buyers to sellers, which represents the competitiveness of the auction markets
and has a direct inﬂuence on the welfare of buyers since it determines their probability of
winning and the expected price if they win.
6The bounds on α follow the bounds on cS and cB. Note that as cB ≥ 0, α ≤ 1 − cS; since cS ≥ 0,
α ≤ 1.
115.1 Ex ante welfare
At the ex-ante stage, buyers and sellers are necessarily worse oﬀ.
Proposition 2
Suppose that vs > 0 and that sellers set their reserve price strategically. If ˆ α > α, then
the ratio of buyers to sellers decreases (n>ˆ n). Thus the ex-ante welfare of buyers and
sellers decreases.
Proof Suppose by way of contradiction that B (ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n) >B(α,r,n).S i n c eρ increases
when α increases, and since B (α,r,n) is decreasing in r and n,i tm u s tb et h a tˆ n<n .
But if the ex-ante surplus of buyers increases, the number of buyers who participate is
also larger. To have ˆ n<n ,it is then necessary that more sellers participate as well,
but this is not possible since the ex-ante proﬁt of sellers decreases with α and n.S o
B (ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n) ≤ B (α,r,n). ¤
Part of the ex-ante welfare loss is due to the lower participation of potential bidders.
The elasticity of participation of buyers and sellers (due to the distribution of partici-
pation costs) is one of the important factors that explains the impact of an increase in
commissions. If buyers’ participation is very elastic (for instance if all buyers have the
same positive cost of participation), the buyer’s ex-ante surplus is left unchanged by the
increase in commissions. The participation decision decreases competition in the mar-
ket to the point that it compensates exactly the direct decrease in welfare due to higher
commissions and reserve prices.
However, the welfare comparisons made in the practice are for the eﬀective buyers and
sellers; ex-ante welfare is not the right measure on which the compensation of eﬀective
buyers should be based since it includes the welfare of buyers who will never win in the
new auction. In auction markets, the deﬁnition of an eﬀective buyer is not as clear as in
traditional markets. We can distinguish between eﬀective bidders and eﬀective buyers:
the former are those whose bid is greater than the reserve price and who therefore have
a chance — at the interim stage — to win the object; the later are the eﬀective bidders
12who actually won the object, that is the observed winners. We consider ﬁrst of eﬀective
bidders.7
Proposition 3
When the participation decision of buyers is elastic, then eﬀective bidders are ex-ante
better oﬀ in the market with high commissions.
Proof When the participation decision is very elastic (identical cost of participation
t for every buyer), the ex-ante welfare does not change with commissions: We have
B(a,r,n)=t = B(ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n). The eﬀective bidders are those with a valuation larger than
the reserve price ˆ ρ. Their ex-ante welfare in the new auction is
R 1
ˆ ρ Bv(v, ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n)f(v)dv =
R 1
ρ Bv(v, ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n)f(v)dv since buyers with type in [ρ,ˆ ρ] have no chance to win the auction.
But now we have that
Z 1
ˆ ρ
Bv(v,ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n)f(v)dv =
Z 1
ρ









The last inequality comes from the fact that in the original market, buyers with type in
[ρ,ˆ ρ] have a positive expected surplus. As long as the participation is elastic, and thus
that B(ˆ α, ˆ r,ˆ n) is not much smaller than B(a,r,n), the previous argument would still
hold.¤
The change of average ex-post welfare of eﬀective buyers and sellers is usually what
economists have in mind when they analyze the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nc o m m i s s i o n si n
order to compensate losers from such an increase. If, ex ante, buyers are worse-oﬀ,i ti s
not clear whether this will also be so ex post. Since sellers change their reserve prices and
since higher reserve prices decrease ex-ante welfare of buyers and thus their participation,
7Our deﬁnition of eﬀective bidders broadly corresponds to the observed bidders in an English (ascend-
ing) auction, used in most salesrooms.
13ex-post, buyers face less competition. Buyers who actually win can end up paying less
than they would have otherwise. Thus compensating the winning buyers might not be
the best idea. We elaborate on this point in the next section.
We summarize this discussion in Figure 1, which shows the timing of the model and






















Figure 1 : Welfare Considerations
Table 1 summarizes the eﬀects of increased commissions on the various welfare mea-
sures that we analyze.
Sellers Buyers Eﬀective bidders Winners
(ex ante) (interim v>ˆ ρ) (ex post)
Worse oﬀ Weakly Better oﬀ Uniform: Better oﬀ on average
worse oﬀ if participation High types: Better oﬀ
not too elastic Low types: Worse oﬀ
Better oﬀ if reserve
price not binding
Table 1
145.2 Ex-post welfare: Winning twice
The welfare of a participant in an auction is a function of the probability of winning and
the expected price conditional on winning. To assess the welfare changes of participants,
it is therefore necessary to take into account the joint variation of these two variables.
This suggests that the welfare consequences of a change in commissions is diﬀerent when
assessed ex-ante (before the winner is known) and ex-post (after he is known).
















He pays the second highest bid if the second highest bid is larger than the reserve
price, or pays the reserve price if there is no other larger bid. Indeed, if v(2) ≥ ρ the
hammer price is v(2)/(1 + cB); otherwise, the hammer price is r.
When v ≥ ρ,w ec a nr e w r i t eW (v,c,r,n) as
Z ρ
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=( v − ρ)
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Suppose that α increases to ˆ α, that is suppose that the reserve price increases from ρ
to ˆ ρ and let n and ˆ n be the corresponding equilibrium values of number of bidders per
auction. We want to compare the expected surplus of winners when the commissions are
ˆ α to what they would have been with α. More competition implies that the winner wins
the object less often, but potentially at a lower price.
The ﬁrst dimension to look at is the price. Had he won in the other auction, a suc-
cessful buyer would have paid a price determined in an environment with a lower reserve
price but more competition. The second dimension is the probability of winning. By
deﬁnition, an observed winner has a probability of winning equal to one in the auction
under consideration. In the market with lower commissions, he would have faced more
15competition. To make a meaningful comparison, we consider the following thought exper-
iment. We ﬁx the valuations of all the bidders present in the new auction, and add new
bidders (n−ˆ n, to be precise) drawing valuations for them. This decreases the probability
of winning from 1 to F (n−ˆ n) (v) f o ra no b s e r v e dw i n n e rw i t hav a l u a t i o no fv.
For valuations that are uniformly distributed, we show that in fact the winner would,
on average, not be willing to pay to face more competition and a low commission, that
is to be faced with a situation similar to the low-commission auction. Compensating
winners in a high-commission auction would therefore make them win twice.
5.3 The uniform distribution case
We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ti ft y p ev wins in the (ˆ ρ, ˆ n) auction, then the expected surpluses
W (v,ˆ ρ, ˆ n) and W (v,ρ,n) satisfy a single crossing property. (All results not appearing in
the text are in the Appendix)
Proposition 4
Consider ˆ ρ > ρ and ˆ n<n .
(i) For v ∈ (ρ,ˆ ρ],W(v,ˆ ρ, ˆ n) − W (v,ρ,n) < 0,
(ii) If n/ˆ n ≤ (1 − ρn)/(1 − ˆ ρ
ˆ n), then W (v,ˆ ρ, ˆ n) − W (v,ρ,n) < 0 for all v,
(iii) If n/ˆ n>(1−ρn)/(1−ˆ ρ
ˆ n), then there is single crossing: There exists a unique v0
such that W (v0,ˆ ρ, ˆ n)− W (v0,n,ρ,n)=0and (v − v0)(W (v,ˆ ρ, ˆ n) − W (v,ρ,n)) > 0 for
all v 6= v0.
Ex-post, we can divide buyers into two groups, the winners and the losers. Highest
types are better oﬀ with higher commissions since they beneﬁt from the reduced compe-
tition and rarely suﬀer from the increased reserve price while lowest types are worse oﬀ
since there is a high probability that the reserve price is binding when they win.
We now consider an example which shows that, on average, winners are better oﬀ in
16the auction with high commissions.
Example 1: An example in which buyers are better oﬀ
Assume that (a) all sellers have a valuation vs = 1
4, (b) sellers have no cost of partici-
pating, (c) buyers have valuations uniformly distributed on [0,1], (d) all buyers have the
same participation cost t =0 .025,8 and (e) the commission ratio α goes from 0 to 50%9








































For α =0 ,r (0) = 5/8,a n dB(0,5/8,n)=( 1− (5/8)n(1 + 3n/8))/n(n +1 ) , and for
ˆ α =0 .5,r (0.5) = 3/4,a n dB(0.5,3/4,n)=( 1− (3/4)n(1 + n/4))/n(n +1 ) .
In Figure 2, we represent the welfare locus for both levels of the commission rate
(reserve prices). The upper (lower) curve is the one for the low (high) commission rate.
The equilibrium ratio is determined when the ex-ante welfare curve crosses the (thick)
straight line that represents the (constant) participation cost. The graph illustrates the
fact that a constant participation cost leads to the highest possible decrease in the degree
of competition.
8Since we want to make the case that successful buyers can be better oﬀ on average, we make the
assumption that all buyers have the same participation cost. This makes buyers’ particpation very elastic,
and leads to the largest possible decrease in participation and the lowest possible degree of competition.
9We suppose for clarity if exposition that the commission is on sellers only. (this is without loss of
generality, as a result of proposition 1).
The increase from no commission to commissions of 50% is very large indeed. This extreme increase
illustrates that even with such steep increase, successful buyers are better oﬀ. Of course, since the






Figure 2: Ex-ante Welfare and Participation
The equilibrium number of participants is obtained when B(.,.) is equal to the par-
ticipation cost t =0 .025. This leads to n =4 .8631 for α =0and ˆ n =2 .2277 for ˆ α =0 .50.
The increase in the commission rate leads has two main eﬀects on the price paid.
First, the second order bid decreases, since the increase in commission leads to a decrease
in the degree of competition: ˆ n<n ; this will decrease the hammer price. Second, the
reserve price increases, so that the price paid by the winner is more likely to be equal to
the reserve price. Whether or not the (higher) reserve price is actually larger than the
(lower) second order bid in the initial auction depends on how fast n decreases when r
increases. The expected price paid by the winner of the auction if his valuation v =1is:












We can then compute the expected price paid by the highest type in both situations.
These are: p(α =0 )=0 .7876, and p(ˆ α =0 .50) = 0.81528. The expected price paid
by the highest type is lower when commissions are high. He is better oﬀ with high
























Figure 3 displays the expected price of a winner of type v in both auctions. We see the
single-crossing property at work. High types (v<0.93985) would pay a lower price in the
auction with no commission. The downward eﬀect on the price due to lower competition
more than compensates the upwards pressure due to a higher reserve price. The eﬀects






Figure 3: Expected price paid by the winner
Comparing prices is only comparing markets along one dimension. The second di-
mension is the probability of winning. And on that dimension, observed winners have
clearly beneﬁted from the increase in commissions that has led to lower participation and
lower competition. As suggested earlier, we make the thought experiment of ﬁnding the
19monetary transfer that would make the winner indiﬀerent between paying the current
price or face more competition but a lower commission (compensating variation).
On average, the welfare of a successful winner of type v is :
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We want to compare this to the welfare he would have had in the auction with low
commissions, discounted with the probability that one of the additional bidders would
have had a higher valuation, that is
(v − E [p|v,n])F
n−ˆ n
(v).





0.8 0.9 1 v
Figure 4 : Comparison of ex-post welfares
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Numerical calculations yield ˆ W =0 .0056 >W=0 .0052. T h ew i n n e r sa r eb e t t e ro ﬀ in
the high commission market and would be ready to pay not to be in a market with lower
commissions.
5.4 Welfare and reserve prices
The previous analysis shows that observed winners may have gained when the intermedi-
ary increases its commission but that they may have lost if the reserve price binds. One
way to simplify the welfare analysis is therefore to verify whether the reserve price set by
the seller was binding. An increase in commissions leads to a higher price only if the price
paid is equal to the reserve price, otherwise the decrease in the degree of competition
n would have driven the price down. Successful buyers who did not pay more than the
reserve price are better oﬀ in a regime of high commissions and low competition than in
a regime of low commission and high competition.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The welfare analysis of taxes is well understood in traditional markets and leads to the
simple conclusion that buyers and sellers are worse oﬀ.I n t h i s p a p e r , w e a r g u e t h a t a
separate analysis is needed in auction markets with intermediaries. The welfare conse-
quences of increased commissions is more ambiguous and eﬀective buyers can be better
21oﬀ with higher commissions since the impact of commissions is compensated by lower
participation and a lower degree of competition.
Our model is relevant to evaluate previous competition policy decisions. For instance,
in 2001, Christie’s and Sotheby’s who had colluded between 1993 and 2000 to set (and
increase their previous) commission rates were convicted to pay $512 millions to compen-
sate their clients for their welfare loss. Buyers received the largest share of this settlement.
This was obviously based on poor understanding of how auctions work. With this decision,
compensated bidders may have won twice, while sellers may not have been compensated
as they should.
227 Appendix
7.1 Optimal Reserve Prices
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The expected revenue of the seller is thus Π =( 1− α)nE[p(x,r)] + F n (r)vs.D i ﬀer-
entiating with respect to r, we obtain:
∂Π
∂r
=( 1 − α)n(1 − F (r) − rf (r))F
n−1(r)+nF
n−1 (r)f (r)vs












where h(x)=f (x)/(1 − F (x)) is the hazard rate associated with distribution F.
Since ∂Π/∂r>0 at r = vs, it is always optimal to choose a reserve price larger than
the seller’s valuation.
The optimal reserve price has to satisfy ∂Π/∂r =0 . This will be true if












237.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We have,
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/nˆ n; this is negative only if n/ˆ n<(1 −
ρn)/(1 − ˆ ρ
ˆ n).
The sign of ∆(b) is equal to the sign of the term in brackets. The derivative of the
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.
Since n − ˆ n>0, the expression is increasing in b. As b ≤ ˆ ρ,W(b;ˆ ρ, ˆ n)=0<W(b;ρ,n)
and ∆(b) < 0, which proves (i). The issue is whether there exist values of b for which
∆(b) > 0.
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where the last implication follows b0 ≥ ˆ ρ. Hence, for b>b 0, ∆(b) > 0 and for b<b 0,
∆(b) < 0. The existence of such a b0 therefore requires that ∆(1) ≥ 0, in which case we
have the single crossing property (iii) . When ∆(1) < 0, we must have ∆(b) < 0 for all
values of b, which proves (ii).
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